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I. INTRODUCTION 
The right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him 
or her is among the most basic protections guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution.1  But under certain circumstances, the 
 
       †     J.D. Candidate 2007, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., 2004, Political 
Science and Psychology, University of Minnesota. 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  In United States v. Burr, Chief Justice John 
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constitutional right to cross-examine one’s accuser conflicts with 
other valuable societal interests.  In State v. Bobadilla,2 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court confronted just such a situation.  Faced 
with the prospect of creating substantial barriers to the prosecution 
of child sexual abuse,3 the Minnesota Supreme Court narrowly 
interpreted the recent United States Supreme Court decision in 
Crawford v. Washington4 to allow the introduction of certain hearsay 
statements made by young children to child protection workers.5  
By permitting the use of such statements, the court undercut the 
basic principles of the Sixth Amendment as defined in Crawford. 
This case note first explores the changing constitutional 
standards by which courts approach the Confrontation Clause, with 
particular emphasis on the theory underlying the right of 
confrontation.6  It then details the facts and procedural history of 
Bobadilla,7 and highlights a number of inadequacies in the court’s 
reasoning.8  Next, it argues that Bobadilla establishes a framework 
that is inconsistent with Crawford.9  This note then suggests an 
alternative approach that courts should utilize when considering 
the admissibility of statements made during child assessment 
interviews.10  Finally, this note briefly considers the possibility that 
factors other than legal precedent may have motivated the court’s 
decision.11 
II. HISTORY 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions . . . the accused shall 
 
Marshall, then presiding over a Federal court in the state of Virginia, wrote in 
reference to the right of confrontation, “I know of no principle in the preservation 
of which all are more concerned.”  25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 
14,694). 
 2. 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006). 
 3. See Matthew M. Staab, Comment, Child’s Play: Avoiding the Pitfalls of 
Crawford v. Washington in Child Abuse Prosecution, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 501, 503 
(2005) (noting that successful sexual abuse prosecutions often require admission 
of a child’s out-of-court statements). 
 4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 5. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 257. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 11. See id. 
2
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enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”12  The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
interpreted the Sixth Amendment as expressing a preference for 
face-to-face confrontation through the right of cross-examination.13  
As early as 1895, the Court spoke of “compelling [a witness] to 
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, 
and judge by his demeanor . . . whether he is worthy of belief.”14  
The Court also noted that “general rules of law of this kind, 
however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, 
must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and 
the necessities of the case.”15  Indeed, the Court has recognized that 
an absolute bar to admission of hearsay evidence, absent 
confrontation, could seriously impede governments’ ability to 
promote public safety and effective law enforcement.16 
A. Pre-Crawford Case Law 
Courts have been forced to confront the inherent conflict 
between the plain language of the Sixth Amendment and the 
practical difficulties associated with rigid adherence to the 
 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 13. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847–48 (1990) (recognizing that 
although out-of-court statements may be admitted against a defendant, there has 
always been a preference to provide the accused an opportunity to confront the 
declarant at trial); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (stating that 
“[w]e have never doubted . . . that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the 
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of 
fact”). 
 14. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).  The Court noted 
that the primary object of the Confrontation Clause was to prevent the use of 
depositions and ex parte affidavits against criminal defendants in lieu of personal 
examination and cross-examination.  Id. at 259. 
 15. Id.  More recently, the Court noted that “in certain narrow circumstances, 
‘competing interests, “if closely examined,” may warrant dispensing with 
confrontation at trial.’”  Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 848 (1990) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980)). 
 16. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (noting that the strong interest in effective law 
enforcement and precise evidentiary rules may warrant dispensing with 
confrontation at trial in certain circumstances).  See also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 
805, 813–14 (1990) (recognizing that the Confrontation Clause has never been 
strictly interpreted as barring all hearsay statements); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (stating that “the right to confront and to cross-examine may 
. . . bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process”); 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the rights of the public should not be sacrificed to give an incidental 
benefit to the accused). 
3
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Confrontation Clause.  Prior to Crawford, such questions were 
controlled by the framework established in Ohio v. Roberts,17 which 
laid out two general restrictions on the admission of out-of-court 
statements used against a criminal defendant.18  First, the Roberts 
standard usually required that prosecutors produce a witness for 
trial or demonstrate the unavailability of the witness.19  Second, the 
unavailable witness’s statement must possess sufficient “indicia of 
reliability.”20  The Court said statements either falling within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception21 or containing “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness” were reliable.22 
The Court elaborated further on the “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness” standard in Idaho v. Wright,23 which 
involved statements made by a two-and-a-half-year-old child to a 
pediatrician relating to alleged sexual abuse.24  In holding the 
child’s statements not to be “particularly trustworthy,” the Court 
rejected the trial court’s partial reliance on factors extraneous to 
the making of the statement, such as physical evidence of the 
alleged abuse.25  Instead, the Court said the “relevant circumstances 
include only those that surround the making of the statement and 
that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.”26  In order 
to satisfy this test, it must be “so clear” that the declarant’s 
statement was truthful that the test of cross-examination “would be 
of marginal utility.”27 
 
 17. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 18. Id. at 65. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. “Firmly rooted” exceptions must be long-standing and have such special 
guarantees of credibility as to be “essentially equivalent to, or greater than, those 
produced by the Constitution’s preference for cross-examined trial testimony.”  
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999). 
 22. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 23. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 24. Id. at 808–09. 
 25. Id. at 826.  The Court expressed concern that the use of corroborating 
evidence to support a hearsay statement could lead to admission of unreliable 
statements by “bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence . . . .”  Id. at 
823. 
 26. Id. at 819.  Justice Kennedy argued in dissent that “[i]t is a matter of 
common sense for most people that one of the best ways to determine whether 
what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence.”  
Id. at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 820.  The Court also rejected the defendant’s contention that a 
victim’s out-of-court statements are per se unreliable if the victim has been found 
incompetent to testify at trial.  Id. at 824.  Although the Court said such a finding 
4
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Applying this rationale in White v. Illinois,28 the Court held that 
a child’s out-of-court statements made to a police officer and 
doctor about alleged sexual abuse, which fell within Illinois’s 
medical diagnosis and spontaneous declaration hearsay exceptions, 
were admissible even if the child was available to testify.29  The 
Court said that because the statements qualified for admission 
under a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, cross-examination was 
unlikely to add to the reliability of the testimony.30  Specifically, the 
Court noted that statements made in the course of receiving 
medical care provide substantial guarantees of trustworthiness that 
are unlikely to be replicated by courtroom testimony.31  According 
to the Court, an unavailability rule would “do little to improve the 
accuracy of fact-finding” while “significantly burdening the fact-
finding process.”32  The Court said that “exclud[ing] such probative 
statements under the strictures of the Confrontation Clause would 
be the height of wrongheadedness, given that the Confrontation 
Clause has as a basic purpose the promotion of the ‘integrity of the 
factfinding process.’”33 
 
is relevant to whether a hearsay statement possesses particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness, a per se rule of exclusion would frustrate the truth-seeking purpose 
behind the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 825. 
 28. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 29. See id. at 356. 
 30. Id. at 357 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990)). 
 31. Id. at 356.  Commentators have criticized the admission of a young child’s 
statements under the medical diagnosis exception on the ground that young 
patients often fail to understand the physician’s role and thus do not appreciate 
the importance of being truthful.  Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who 
Believe the Children?: The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception 
Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 233–34 (1995).  Since the rationale behind the 
medical diagnosis exception is the declarant’s self-interest in receiving appropriate 
medical care, a declarant’s inability to comprehend the purpose of a statement to 
a medical professional would negate the inherent reliability of the statement.  Id.  
See also Krista MacNevin Jee, Comment, Hearsay Exceptions in Child Abuse Cases: Have 
the Courts and Legislatures Really Considered the Child?, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 559, 569 
(1998) (arguing that because a child may not appreciate the consequences of a 
false statement to a doctor, it cannot be assumed that the medical diagnosis 
exception applies to all children). 
 32. White, 502 U.S. at 355.  The Court noted that an unavailability rule would 
require prosecutors to continuously locate and keep available each declarant, even 
when neither party has an interest in calling the witness to the stand.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 356–57 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)).  The Court 
also rejected an argument advanced by the United States as amicus curiae that the 
Confrontation Clause was designed primarily to prevent the prosecution of 
defendants through the presentation of ex parte affidavits.  Id. at 352.  Under such 
a theory, the Confrontation Clause would only apply to “those few cases where the 
statement sought to be admitted was in the character of an ex parte affidavit, i.e., 
5
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B. Tender-Year Statutes 
Around the time the Supreme Court decided Roberts, the 
problem of child sexual abuse began to receive increased public 
attention.34  Citizens demanded legislative reforms designed to 
protect children and lock up those who perpetrate sexual abuse.35  
Many state legislatures responded by passing tender-year statutory 
hearsay exceptions, which provided for the admission of certain 
hearsay statements made by children in sexual abuse cases.36  
Consistent with Roberts, most tender-year statutes conditioned the 
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay on a finding that 
statements possessed sufficient “indicia of reliability,” and many 
required corroborative evidence of the act.37 
Minnesota’s tender-year statute permits the introduction of 
out-of-court statements made by children under the age of ten 
relating to acts of sexual or physical abuse if certain requirements 
 
where the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statement’s utterance 
suggest that the statement has been made for the principal purpose of accusing or 
incriminating the defendant.”  Id.  According to the Court, the government’s view, 
which would essentially eliminate the Sixth Amendment’s role in restricting the 
admission of hearsay testimony, “is foreclosed by . . . prior cases” and “comes too 
late in the day to warrant reexamination of this approach.”  Id. at 352–53.  Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence suggested that “[t]his interpretation is in some ways more 
consistent with the test and history of the Clause than our current jurisprudence,” 
but cautioned that “[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements made in 
contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the 
courts in a multitude of difficulties.”  Id. at 364. 
 34. See Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the 
Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. 
REV. 175, 178–79 (1991) (describing a “public outcry for legislative reforms” with 
regard to child sexual abuse in the late 1970s and early 1980s).  Public attention 
was, and still is, much needed.  Experts estimate that twelve percent of the 100,000 
to 500,000 cases of child abuse that occur each year involve sexual abuse.  Id. at 
178. 
 35. Id. at 178–79. 
 36. Marks, supra note 31, at 236–37. 
 37. Id. at 241–42.  Most states that passed statutory tender-year exceptions 
permitted the introduction of a child’s otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements 
if: (1) the child was under a particular age, usually ten to thirteen years old; (2) 
the adverse party had notice; and (3) the child either (a) testified or (b) was 
unavailable and there was corroborative evidence of the act.  Id. at 238–40.  See, 
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (2004).  A few states required that the 
child: (1) be available to testify; or (2) was subject to cross-examination at the time 
he or she made the statement.  Marks, supra note 31, at 239.  See, e.g., TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (Vernon 2005) (tender-year exception applicable 
only if the child testified or was available to testify). 
6
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are satisfied.38  First, the child must either testify at the proceeding, 
or the child must be unavailable to testify while corroborative 
evidence is available to support the allegation.39  Second, the court 
must hold a hearing and find that the circumstances of the child’s 
statements offer “sufficient indicia of reliability.”40  The statute also 
expressly states that video, audio, or other recorded statements are 
admissible if the other requirements of the statute are satisfied.41 
Thus, prior to Crawford, a child’s statements implicating a 
defendant in a sexual abuse case were often admissible if the 
statements either fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or 
possessed some “indicia of reliability.”42  Although such a minimal 
standard alarmed some legal commentators,43 the approach 
lessened the burden on prosecutors.44  Even if a child was declared 
incompetent to testify, the child’s statements were usually 
admissible if prosecutors could show the statements fell within a 
“firmly rooted” hearsay exception or possessed “indicia of 
reliability.”45 
C. A New Standard: Crawford v. Washington 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. 
Washington46 dramatically changed the constitutional standard by 
which courts view the admission of out-of-court statements.47  In 
Crawford, the State of Washington introduced out-of-court 
 
 38. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2004). 
 39. See id. at subdiv. 3(b). 
 40. See id. at subdiv. 3(a).  The statute specifies that “the time, content, and 
circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the 
statement is made” must “provide sufficient indicia of reliability.”  Id.  This 
standard is consistent with the constitutional standard explained in Idaho v. Wright.  
See 497 U.S. 805, 813–15 (1990). 
 41. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2004).  Prosecutors must also give notice 
of intent to offer the statement so as to provide the defendant an “opportunity to 
prepare to meet the statement.”  See id. at subdiv. 3(c). 
 42. See Staab, supra note 3, at 507. 
 43. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay 
Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 
691, 693 (1993); Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the 
Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1260 (2003). 
 44. See Staab, supra note 3, at 507; see also Marks, supra note 31, at 216 
(arguing that prosecutors often prefer to use hearsay evidence because juries may 
be more willing to accept a child’s out-of-court statements as true). 
 45. Staab, supra note 3, at 507. 
 46. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 47. Staab, supra note 3, at 501–02. 
7
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statements made by the defendant’s wife that tended to contradict 
the defendant’s self-defense claim.48  The Court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction, and in the process overturned the previous 
Roberts regime.49  The Court rejected Roberts’s focus on the 
reliability of a statement, saying that the Confrontation Clause is a 
“procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”50  As such, the 
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed . . . by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”51 
The Court indicated that the history and plain language of the 
Confrontation Clause implied a heightened concern with out-of-
court statements that are “testimonial” in nature.52  The Court held 
such statements were admissible only if the declarant was 
unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine.53  As for nontestimonial statements, the Court was 
initially unclear,54 although subsequent case law indicates that 
nontestimonial hearsay is not subject to any constitutional 
restrictions.55 
 
 48. 541 U.S. at 40.  The defendant’s wife was unavailable to testify because of 
Washington’s marital privilege.  Id.  The trial court permitted the prosecution to 
introduce the wife’s tape-recorded statements after holding that the statements 
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id.  The Washington Court of 
Appeals reversed the conviction after concluding that the statements failed to 
offer sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.  Id. at 41.  The Washington Supreme 
Court reinstated the conviction, saying that the statements did in fact contain 
“guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id. 
 49. Id. at 66, 68–69. 
 50. Id. at 61. 
 51. Id.  The Court also noted that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because 
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty.”  Id. at 62. 
 52. Id. at 51. 
 53. Id. at 61. 
 54. The Court wrote, “Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly 
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their 
development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that 
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”  Id. at 
68. 
 55. Although the constitutional standard applied to nontestimonial 
statements was initially uncertain, the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. 
Washington indicated that the Sixth Amendment no longer restricted the use of 
nontestimonial hearsay at trial.  126 S.Ct. 2266, 2274–75 (2006).  Specifically, the 
Court wrote, “It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from 
other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, 
is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”  Id. at 2273.  After noting that the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned with testimonial hearsay, the Court wrote that 
“[a] limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must 
8
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The Crawford Court declined to precisely define what 
constitutes a testimonial statement.56  The Court did say that, at a 
minimum, testimonial statements included prior formal testimony 
and police interrogations.57  It added that “[a]n accuser who makes 
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a 
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance 
does not.”58  Crawford also stressed the concern held by the Framers 
of the Constitution regarding statements made with the 
“[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of 
testimony with an eye toward trial,”59 which present a “unique 
potential for prosecutorial abuse.”60  The lack of a precise 
 
fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”  Id. at 2274.  In 
other words, nontestimonial statements fall outside the “perimeter” of the 
Confrontation Clause.  Consequently, Sixth Amendment restrictions do not apply 
to them.  James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v. Roberts, 
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2006, at 37–38.  Despite this language, a number of courts have 
continued to apply Roberts to nontestimonial hearsay.  Id.  See, e.g., State v. Blue, 
717 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 2006) (arguing that “[t]he reliability and 
trustworthiness factors are still to be used for nontestimonial statements”).  Other 
courts have recognized that nontestimonial statements are no longer subject to 
the Roberts reliability test.  See, e.g., United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 665 n.2 
(7th Cir. 2006) (stating, in dicta, that Davis appears to “[hold] that nontestimonial 
hearsay is not subject to the Confrontation Clause”). 
 56. 454 F.3d at 665 n.2.  Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in White v. 
Illinois indicated that courts may have difficultly articulating a precise definition of 
which statements are made in contemplation of a legal proceedings.  502 U.S. 346, 
364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).  In White, Justice Thomas wrote: 
Attempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of 
legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a 
multitude of difficulties.  Few types of statements could be categorically 
characterized as within or without the reach of a defendant’s 
confrontation rights.  Not even statements made to the police or 
government officials could be deemed automatically subject to the right 
of confrontation (imagine a victim who blurts out an accusation to a 
passing police officer, or the unsuspecting social-services worker who is 
told of possible child abuse). 
Id. 
 57. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).  The Court indicated 
that various definitions of “testimonial statements” exist.  One is “ex parte in-court 
testimony or its functional equivalent.”  Id. at 51.  Another is “formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.”  Id. at 51–52 (quoting White, 502 U.S. 346, 365).  Yet another is 
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.”  Id. at 52. 
 58. Id. at 51. 
 59. 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. 
 60. Id. 
9
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definition has left lower courts with the task of deciding which 
statements qualify as testimonial. 
D. Minnesota Case Law 
The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered the question 
in State v. Wright,61 which involved statements made by two domestic 
abuse victims to a 911 operator and responding police officers.62  
The court provided a non-exclusive list of factors to weigh in 
determining whether a statement made to law enforcement is 
testimonial, including the purpose for making the statement, law 
enforcement’s intention in speaking with the declarant, and the 
level of formality associated with the conversation.63  In applying 
these factors, the court noted that the responding police officers 
interviewed the declarants shortly after the incident, and at a time 
when police were still ascertaining exactly what happened and 
whether there was still danger.64  Although the police officers took 
 
 61. 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 2979 (2006).  Shortly 
after the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Bobadilla, 709 
N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006), the United States Supreme Court vacated Wright and 
remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court for further consideration in light of 
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2979 (2006).  In Davis, the defendant’s girlfriend 
called 911 to report that the defendant was physically attacking her.  126 S.Ct. 
2266, 2271 (2006).  The defendant fled the scene shortly after the call began, and 
the operator continued asking the caller questions about the defendant’s identify.  
Id.  The Court noted that once the defendant left the scene, the emergency 
apparently ended.  Id. at 2277.  The Court held that any statements made by the 
caller to the 911 operator after the defendant fled “were testimonial, not unlike 
the ‘structured police questioning’ that occurred in Crawford.”  Id.  The Court 
considered those statements made before the defendant fled the scene, and hence 
while there was still an ongoing emergency, to be nontestimonial.  Id.  Along with 
Davis, the Court also decided a companion case, discussed infra note 122, 
involving statements made by domestic abuse victims to law enforcement. 
 62. 701 N.W.2d at 806–08. 
 63. Id. at 812–13.  Specifically, the considerations articulated by the court in 
determining whether a statement is testimonial are: 
(1) whether the declarant was a victim or an observer; (2) the declarant's 
purpose in speaking with the officer (e.g., to obtain assistance); (3) 
whether it was the police or the declarant who initiated the conversation; 
(4) the location where the statements were made (e.g., the declarant's 
home, a squad car, or the police station); (5) the declarant's emotional 
state when the statements were made; (6) the level of formality and 
structure of the conversation between the officer and declarant; (7) the 
officers' purpose in speaking with the declarant (e.g., to secure the scene, 
determine what happened, or collect evidence); and (8) if and how the 
statements were recorded. 
Id. 
 64. Id. at 813–14. 
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notes of the interview and used those notes to refresh their 
recollections at trial, the court held the statements were 
nontestimonial, saying that a reasonable person in similar 
circumstances “would not make statements in contemplation of a 
trial.”65 
In State v. Scacchetti,66 the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
considered statements made by a three-year-old child to a nurse 
practitioner without law enforcement involvement.67  The court 
held the child’s statements were made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis, and thus were nontestimonial.68  Similarly, in State v. 
Krasky,69 the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed a district court 
order suppressing statements made by a seven-year-old child to a 
nurse practitioner.70  Although a police detective observed the 
interview, the court held that a reasonable child of the victim’s age 
would not believe the statements would be available for trial, and 
thus the statements were nontestimonial.71 
E. Other Jurisdictions 
Other jurisdictions have also recognized that certain 
statements made by young children relating to sexual abuse are 
nontestimonial.  The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a four-
year-old child’s statement to a physician indicating that the 
defendant molested her was nontestimonial.72  The court based its 
holding largely on the medical purpose of the physician’s interview 
with the child and the lack of government involvement in the 
initiation or course of the examination.73  The decision also rested 
 
 65. Id. at 814. 
 66. 690 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 
2006). 
 67. Id. at 394. 
 68. Id. at 396. 
 69. 696 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d on remand, 721 N.W.2d 916 
(Minn. App. 2006). 
 70. Id. at 820.  Eight months after the Minnesota Supreme Court decided 
Bobadilla, the court of appeals reconsidered Krasky and concluded the statements 
were testimonial.  721 N.W.2d at 924.  The court cited subsequent state and 
federal case law in justifying its holding and noted that the nurse practitioner was 
“acting in concert” with government investigators when conducting the interview.  
Id. at 923. 
 71. Krasky, 696 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d on remand, 721 
N.W.2d 916. 
 72. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 293 (Neb. 2004). 
 73. Id. at 291. 
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upon the lack of any indication of a purpose to develop testimony 
for trial.74 
The Washington Court of Appeals similarly held that 
statements made by a four-year-old child to a family physician were 
nontestimonial.75  The court said there was no indication of a 
purpose to prepare testimony for trial, and it also noted that the 
circumstances would not lead a reasonable observer to conclude 
the physician was attempting to elicit statements for use at trial.76 
But the Maryland Court of Appeals held that statements made 
by an eight-year-old and a ten-year-old to a social worker were 
testimonial, partly because the social worker took the statements in 
the course of a joint investigation with local law enforcement.77  A 
police detective was present at each of the two interviews, and both 
children indicated their knowledge that the interview resulted from 
accusations against the defendant.78  In determining that the 
statements were testimonial, the court asked whether an objective 
declarant would reasonably believe her statements would be 
available for use at trial.79 
Although courts must decide each case on its own facts, before 
Bobadilla, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not yet addressed the 
impact of Crawford on prosecutors’ attempts to introduce 
statements made by young children.  The atmosphere was ripe for a 
decision considering when a young sexual abuse victim’s statements 
are testimonial. 
III. THE BOBADILLA DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
On the evening of May 4, 2003, three-year-old T.B. returned to 
his mother’s care after spending a weekend with his father, who 
resided with twenty-three-year-old defendant Orlando Bobadilla.80  
Upon noticing redness on T.B.’s buttocks, T.B.’s mother asked T.B. 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
 76. Id. 
 77. State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 325 (Md. 2005). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Minn. 2006).  T.B.’s father is 
Orlando Bobadilla’s brother.  Id. 
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about the cause of the discoloration.81  T.B. initially hesitated, but 
eventually he stated that “Uncle Orlando” had inserted his finger 
into T.B.’s “booty.”82 
T.B.’s parents brought him to the hospital where an 
emergency room physician noted abnormal erythema, or redness, 
around T.B.’s rectum, which was consistent with the events T.B. 
described.83  The Willmar Police Department took an assault report 
at the hospital and forwarded the report to the Kandiyohi County 
Family Service Department.84  A child protection worker from 
Kandiyohi County attempted to contact T.B.’s mother over the 
next several days by telephone but did not reach her until five days 
later.85  The child protection worker arranged to interview T.B. at 
the local law enforcement center.86 
The child protection worker and an out-of-uniform Willmar 
Police detective met with T.B. and his family later that day at the 
law enforcement center.87  The meeting took place in a “child-
friendly” room equipped with a video camera that recorded the 
interview from behind a one-way mirror.88  The child protection 
worker conducted the interview while the police detective observed 
from across the room.89  The child protection worker used an 
interviewing technique known as the “CornerHouse protocol,” 
which was developed specifically to interview children who have 
been victims of sexual abuse.90  The CornerHouse protocol is 
designed to elicit accurate information about alleged abuse by 
directing interviewers to ask nonleading questions in a 
nonsuggestive manner.91 
After asking several preliminary questions, the child protection 
worker specifically asked T.B. if anybody hurt his body, to which 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 246–47. 
 85. Id. at 247. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  The interview took place on May 9, 2003.  Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  The CornerHouse protocol requires the interviewer to establish 
rapport with the child, determine the child’s terms for parts of the anatomy, 
ascertain whether abuse occurred, and close with a safety message.  Id.  The 
interview is to progress quickly due to the short attention span of most children.  
Id. 
13
Everson: Criminal Law-Conflicting Values: Confrontation Rights in Sexual A
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
7. EVERSON - RC.DOC 3/7/2007  1:04:24 PM 
666 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
T.B. responded affirmatively.92  When asked who hurt his body, T.B. 
stated, “Orlando did.”93  Further questioning revealed that 
Bobadilla penetrated his finger into T.B.’s buttocks.94  T.B. 
indicated the alleged abuse occurred in his father’s bedroom while 
his father was downstairs, although later in the interview T.B. 
responded “yeah” when asked if his father witnessed the abuse.95  
The child protection worker also asked T.B. to show her what 
happened using an anatomically correct doll.96  Although T.B. 
indicated he would, he ultimately failed to use the doll to 
demonstrate what occurred.97 
Bobadilla was charged with first- and second-degree criminal 
sexual conduct.98  At trial, the district court found T.B. 
incompetent to testify but permitted T.B.’s mother and the child 
protection worker to testify about T.B.’s statements implicating 
Bobadilla.99  The court also allowed the state to introduce the 
videotape of T.B.’s interview.100  Based on these statements and the 
testimony of the emergency room physician, the jury convicted 
Bobadilla of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.101 
Bobadilla argued on appeal that admission of the statements 
made to the child protection worker violated his constitutional 
right of confrontation.102  The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed 
that T.B’s statements to the child protection worker were 
 
 92. Id.  The child protection worker first asked T.B. about his parents, and 
then had T.B. identify his names for various parts of the anatomy using a diagram 
of a male.  Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 248.  First-degree criminal sexual conduct involves sexual 
penetration with another person less than thirteen years of age when the actor is 
more than thirty-six months older than the complainant.  MINN. STAT. § 609.342, 
subdiv. 1(a) (2004).  Second-degree criminal sexual conduct involves sexual 
contact with another person less than thirteen years old when the actor is more 
than thirty-six months older than the complainant.  MINN. STAT. § 609.343, subdiv. 
1(a) (2004). 
 99. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 248.  The court found that the statements were 
sufficiently reliable to permit their admission as substantive evidence under 
Minnesota’s tender-year hearsay exception, which is codified at Minnesota Statutes 
section 595.02, subdivision 3 (2004).  Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  The district court sentenced Bobadilla to 144 months.  Id. 
 102. Id.  The United States Supreme Court decided Crawford while Bobadilla’s 
appeal was pending before the Minnesota Court of Appeals.  Id. 
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testimonial and reversed Bobadilla’s conviction.103  The court 
expressly found that the interview was conducted to develop a case 
against Bobadilla, and thus T.B.’s answers were testimonial.104 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that T.B.’s statements 
were nontestimonial.105  The court based its holding mainly on its 
conclusion that T.B.’s statements were not made primarily to 
preserve testimony for trial.106  Consistent with the underlying 
theme of State v. Wright,107 the court found the key to determining 
whether a statement is testimonial rests on whether the declarant 
or government questioner was acting, to a substantial degree, to 
produce a statement for trial.108 
The court concluded that the primary purpose of T.B.’s 
interview was to establish whether abuse occurred and the steps 
necessary to protect T.B.’s welfare.109  In reaching this conclusion, 
the court relied upon the “clearly delineated purpose” behind the 
statutory scheme controlling the sexual abuse investigation, which 
the majority said was to protect the health and welfare of 
children.110  The court also said that producing statements for 
future use at trial was incidental to determining whether abuse 
occurred and that T.B.’s young age made it doubtful he 
understood that prosecutors might use his statements against the 
defendant.111 
IV.   ANALYSIS 
A. Incomplete Reasoning and Misconstrued Facts 
Although Bobadilla’s standard for considering the admissibility 
of T.B.’s statements was generally consistent with post-Crawford case 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. State v. Bobadilla, 690 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 709 
N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006). 
 105. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 256. 
 106. Id. at 255–56. 
 107. State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2979 
(2006). 
 108. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 252–53. 
 109. Id. at 255–56. 
 110. Id. at 254–55. 
 111. Id. at 255–56. 
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law,112 the court ultimately erred in finding that the statements were 
nontestimonial.  The general approach, reflected in Minnesota and 
national case law, is to consider whether law enforcement was 
involved in the interview, as well as the intention of both the 
questioner and declarant.113  After reaffirming this standard,114 the 
court misconstrued the significance of certain factors surrounding 
T.B.’s statements to the social worker and police detective.  The 
ultimate result in Bobadilla established precedent that jeopardizes 
the fairness of future sexual abuse prosecutions.115 
1. Application of Minnesota Statutory Scheme 
The court based its conclusion that T.B.’s statements were 
nontestimonial in part on a statutory scheme that had a “clearly 
delineated purpose . . . to protect the health and welfare of 
children.”116  According to the majority, the statute supported a 
finding that government officials obtained T.B.’s statements to 
protect his welfare, rather than to further criminal prosecution.117 
But contrary to the majority’s contention, the statutory scheme 
indicated that T.B.’s statements were testimonial.  The scheme 
provided that law enforcement and local welfare agencies were to 
coordinate the execution of their investigative and assessment 
efforts.118  It further required that law enforcement prepare a 
report of the results of its investigation.119  Thus, the statutory 
scheme mandated that government officials conduct the interview 
with T.B. as part of a law enforcement investigation, albeit a joint 
investigation with child welfare officials.120  The statute essentially 
dictated the “[i]nvolvement of government officers . . . with an eye 
toward trial.”121  Statements taken under such circumstances fall 
within the class of statements that Crawford deemed testimonial.122 
 
 112. See supra Part II.D–E. 
 113. See supra Part II.D–E. 
 114. See State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 253–54 (Minn. 2006). 
 115. Id. at 257. 
 116. Id. at 254–55. 
 117. Id. 
 118. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subdiv. 10(a)(4) (2004). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004). 
 122. Id. at 53.  The post-Bobadilla U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hammon v. 
Indiana, which was decided in tandem with Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2271 
(2006), further indicates that T.B.’s statements were testimonial.  In Hammon, the 
Court held that statements made by a domestic abuse victim to police officers 
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A police detective, who generally has an eye towards trial,123 
was present throughout T.B.’s interview, which took place at a 
police station.124  Although not actively participating, the detective 
observed the interview125 and was statutorily required to prepare a 
report of the results of his investigation.126  Thus, one of the two 
government officials present for T.B.’s interview was gathering facts 
for the purpose of building a criminal case.  But the majority failed 
to consider the detective when it said that “neither the child-
protection worker nor the child declarant, T.B., were acting, to a 
substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.”127 
2. Bobadilla and Snowden 
The majority went on to distinguish Bobadilla from Snowden v. 
State,128 a Maryland case involving a “statutory interviewing scheme  
. . . designed with the express purpose of facilitating the creation of 
 
minutes after an alleged assault were testimonial.  Id. at 2280.  The Court noted 
that the victim made the statements in response to specific police questions 
regarding potential past criminal events.  Id. at 2278.  Davis involved statements 
made by a domestic abuse victim during a 911 call.  Id. at 2270–71.  The Court 
held that statements made while the perpetrator was present, and hence while 
there was an ongoing emergency, were nontestimonial.  Id. at 2277.  The Court 
concluded that those statements made after the perpetrator fled and the 
immediate emergency ended were testimonial.  Id.  In discussing the impact of 
Davis on Bobadilla, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that, under the analysis 
presented in Davis,  
the statutory policy for a mandatory ‘investigation’ of child-abuse reports 
takes on added importance.  It becomes significant that the statute 
requires the coordination of investigative efforts with police authorities, 
the taking of a single statement in a joint effort of police and other 
responsible agencies, and the preservation of a record of the child’s 
statements. 
State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 123. See Stephanie McMahon, Note, The Turbulent Aftermath of Crawford v. 
Washington: Where Do Child Abuse Victims’ Statements Stand?, 33 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 361, 370 (2006) (noting that a police officer’s duty is to investigate crimes for 
later prosecution). 
 124. See supra Part III.A. 
 125. See supra Part III.B. 
 126. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subdiv. 10(4) (2004). 
 127. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2006).  The majority’s 
conclusion is also directly contradictory to the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 
finding that the circumstances surrounding the interview “clearly indicate that the 
interview was conducted for purpose [sic] of developing a case against Bobadilla.”  
State v. Bobadilla, 690 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 709 N.W.2d 
243 (Minn. 2006). 
 128. Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), aff’d, State v. 
Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005). 
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out-of-court statements for a future trial.”129  This, according to the 
majority, stood “in contrast” to Minnesota’s statutory interviewing 
scheme, which has as a primary purpose the protection of 
children.130  The majority’s reasoning, however, misconstrued the 
nature of the statutory schemes involved in Bobadilla and Snowden. 
The majority’s characterization of the Maryland statute as 
being a “statutory interviewing scheme”131 was misleading.  This 
supposed “statutory interviewing scheme” was simply Maryland’s 
tender-year statute,132 which provided for the admission of 
statements about alleged sexual abuse made by children to various 
education and social welfare professionals.133  The statute made no 
mention of an interview or the means by which authorities were to 
investigate child sexual abuse.134  The majority’s description of the 
statute as being a “statutory interviewing scheme” wrongly implied 
that the scheme controlled how authorities were to interview sexual 
abuse victims.  Instead, the statute merely established a hearsay 
exception for certain statements made by young children relating 
to alleged sexual abuse.135 
The majority compared Maryland’s tender-year statute to the 
statutory scheme controlling the investigation in Bobadilla.136  But 
the two statutes served entirely different functions in each case.  
The court should have compared the statutory scheme controlling 
the investigation in Bobadilla with the statutory scheme controlling 
the investigation in Snowden. 
The sexual abuse investigation in Snowden was controlled in 
part by a statutory scheme found in the Maryland Family Code.137  
The scheme required that local child welfare agencies and law 
enforcement implement a procedure for conducting joint 
investigations of sexual abuse.138  Although the scheme did not 
require authorities to record any interviews, it did mandate that 
child protection agencies and law enforcement coordinate their 
 
 129. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 255. 
 130. Id. at 254–55. 
 131. See id. at 255. 
 132. Snowden, 846 A.2d at 39, aff’d, Snowden, 867 A.2d 314. 
 133. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM PROC. § 11-304 (2004).  Specifically, the statute 
permits introduction of certain out-of-court statements made to physicians, 
psychologists, nurses, social workers, or educators.  Id. § 11-304(c). 
 134. Id. § 11-304. 
 135. Id. 
 136. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006). 
 137. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-701–714 (2004). 
 138. Id. § 5-706(e). 
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respective investigations so as to minimize harm to the child.139  
More significantly, the express purpose of the scheme was “to 
protect children who have been the subject of abuse.”140 
Thus, the investigations in both Snowden and Bobadilla were 
controlled by a statutory framework with an express purpose of 
protecting children, which negates the majority’s claim that 
Minnesota’s interviewing scheme stood in contrast to the “statutory 
interviewing scheme” involved in Snowden.141  Additionally, the 
Bobadilla majority failed to consider that the trial court admitted 
T.B.’s statements pursuant to Minnesota’s tender-year statute.142  
The statements in Snowden were similarly admitted pursuant to 
Maryland’s tender-year statute,143 which the Bobadilla majority said 
“was designed with the express purpose of facilitating . . . 
statements for a future trial.”144  If the majority had compared the 
statute under which the statements were admitted in Snowden 
(Maryland’s tender-year statute) with the statute under which T.B.’s 
statements were admitted (Minnesota’s tender-year statute), the 
court would have recognized that T.B.’s statements were admitted 
under a statute designed with the express purpose of facilitating 
the introduction of statements at trial.  In focusing on Maryland’s 
tender-year statute and Minnesota’s child abuse investigation 
procedures, the majority effectively cherry-picked the relevant 
statutory schemes to fit its conclusion that T.B.’s statements were 
nontestimonial.145 
Ultimately, there are several facts that distinguish Snowden and 
Bobadilla.  The children in Snowden were older146 and indicated an 
understanding that officials could use their statements in a 
testimonial manner.147  The trial court in Snowden also expressly 
found the child welfare officer conducted the interview to preserve 
statements for trial.148  Rather than follow the Maryland court’s 
model and carefully weigh the circumstances surrounding T.B.’s 
 
 139. Id. § 5-706(f)(2)(ii). 
 140. Id. § 5-702. 
 141. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 255 
 142. Id. at 248. 
 143. Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 41–42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), aff’d, 
State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005). 
 144. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 255. 
 145. Id. at 254. 
 146. Snowden, 867 A.2d at 316.  The children in Snowden were eight and ten 
years old.  Id. 
 147. Id. at 326. 
 148. Id. 
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statements, the majority in Bobadilla based its conclusion, in part, 
on a statutory scheme that does not directly bear on the critical 
issue: why did this specific child welfare officer and police detective 
interview T.B.? 
3. Bobadilla and Wright 
Beyond the “clearly delineated purpose” of the statutory 
interviewing scheme, the majority supported its holding by alluding 
to State v. Wright,149 which involved statements made during a 911 
call and to responding officers.150  The majority in Bobadilla argued 
the statements at issue in both Wright and Bobadilla “represent[ed] 
a response to a call for assistance and preliminary determination of 
‘what happened’ and whether there was immediate danger.”151  The 
circumstances of the statements in Wright, however, are significantly 
different than those of Bobadilla.  In Wright, the court noted the 
statements made to responding officers were “nearly 
contemporaneous” with an emergency call for help.152  The 
responding officers also lacked details about the emergency 
situation.153 
In Bobadilla, on the other hand, T.B.’s statements were made 
five days after authorities received the initial sexual abuse report,154 
which is significantly later than the “nearly contemporaneous” 
statements in Wright.  The police took the preliminary report when 
T.B.’s mother initially brought him to the emergency room, and 
this report was forwarded to the police detective and child 
 
 149. 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006).  See supra 
note 61. 
 150. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 254. 
 151. Id., 709 N.W.2d at 255 (quoting State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 813–14 
(Minn. 2005)). 
 152. Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 813.  The analysis in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 
2266 (2006), suggests that statements made to the responding police officers in 
Wright may be testimonial.  See supra note 122.  In Davis, the Court placed great 
importance on the fact that the declarant was describing past events to law 
enforcement about an alleged domestic assault.  126 S. Ct. at 2274.  Even though 
the events took place just minutes earlier and police had to prevent the defendant 
from interfering with the discussion between police and the declarant (id. at 
2272), the Court held the statements were not given under circumstances 
exhibiting an immediate danger.  Id. at 2278.  Instead, the declarant was 
describing past events, indicating that police were not seeking to determine “‘what 
is happening,’ but rather ‘what happened.’”  Id.  Statements taken by law 
enforcement under these circumstances are testimonial.  Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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protective officer.155  Thus, contrary to the majority’s contention, 
the interview with T.B. did not represent a preliminary 
determination of what happened.  Both the police detective and 
child protection worker already had a preliminary report, which 
had been produced by a police officer five days earlier.  Unlike 
Wright, the interview with T.B. was a formal, structured examination 
conducted by government officials in response to an initial report 
of abuse perpetrated by a specific individual.156 
B. Implications of Bobadilla 
Bobadilla established a framework in which defendants are 
largely denied the ability to confront statements made under 
circumstances that call for close scrutiny by a finder of fact.  At the 
same time, the decision encourages investigators to manipulate 
interviewing conditions to create a nontestimonial appearance so 
that prosecutors can use the interview for testimonial purposes.  
The ultimate result in Bobadilla established precedent that 
endangers the confrontation rights of those accused of sexually 
abusing children. 
1. The Need to Scrutinize Child Interview Statements 
The Bobadilla majority focused extensively on the need for 
investigators to conduct a single child-assessment interview.157  In 
doing so, the majority failed to acknowledge the defendant’s 
equally compelling, constitutionally dictated interest in 
confrontation.158  Indeed, the very reason children often cannot 
testify reveals the dangers of admitting a child’s out-of-court 
statements.159  Commentators have repeatedly recognized the 
 
 155. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 156. The Appellate Court of Illinois held that statements were testimonial in a 
similar case involving an interview with a seven-year-old sexual abuse victim.  In re 
Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).  The interview took place at 
a child advocacy center one week after the alleged incident.  Id. at 186.  A social 
worker conducted the interview while a police officer observed through a two-way 
mirror.  Id.  The court said the child’s statements were “in response to formal 
questioning, with a police officer watching through a two-way mirror,” and thus 
were testimonial.  Id. at 188. 
 157. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (2006).  The court indicated that 
avoiding multiple interviews with children reduces trauma for the child and 
decreases the chance the child will be confused by suggestive questions.  Id. 
 158. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 159. See William O’Donohue et al., Forensic Interviews with Children: Lying is Not 
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inherent problems associated with over-reliance on a child’s 
statements.160  Studies indicate children are susceptible to 
suggestive questioning and often incorporate misleading 
information into their recollection of an event.161  Many young 
children consider the “correct” answer to be the response that 
pleases an adult,162 which can lead to false reports of abuse if an 
interviewer is overzealous in his or her questioning.163  A child’s 
suggestibility indicates a greater need to scrutinize the testimony, 
particularly when government officers are involved in procuring 
the statements. 
The need for scrutiny is further intensified when a child has 
 
the Major Problem, NEV. LAWYER, Oct. 2005, at 28, 32 (discussing the highly 
suggestible nature of children and their tendency to give erroneous answers in 
response to leading questions). 
 160. Fitzpatrick, supra note 34, at 200–01; see also Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. 
Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children’s Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
181, 185–90 (1986) (arguing that children can accurately recall events but often 
inaccurately report information or falsely incorporate details suggested by 
interviewers); Marks, supra note 31, at 221–22 (noting that a child’s out-of-court 
statements “are particularly susceptible to problems of untrustworthiness”). 
 161. See Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 160, at 187.  See also Dana D. 
Anderson, Note, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 2117, 1237–38 (1996) (discussing the need to ask “more direct, even 
slightly leading” questions to elicit information from children and the 
corresponding risk that such questioning will result in inaccurate reporting of 
sexual abuse). 
 162. State v. Storch, 612 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing that a 
child’s conception of truth may be what pleases an adult questioner). 
 163. For an extreme example of how poor interviewing can lead to false 
reports of sexual abuse, see State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994).  In 
Michaels, a day-care teacher was charged with 174 counts of sexual offenses 
involving twenty children.  Id. at 1375.  The investigation began after a three-year-
old child had his temperature taken rectally and commented that his teacher did 
the same thing to him.  Id. at 1374.  Investigators with the local police and child 
welfare agency repeatedly interviewed a number of children at the day care, often 
asking leading questions and providing children details of allegations made by 
other children.  Id. at 1379–81.  The children ultimately reported that the teacher 
performed a number of bizarre sexual acts, many of which were largely 
unsupported by corroborating evidence.  Id. at 1375.  The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, in affirming the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction, 
criticized the interviewing techniques used on the children, saying investigators 
asked suggestive questions and frequently used positive and negative 
reinforcement to elicit desired responses.  Id. at 1379–81.  The court noted that 
interviewers vilified the defendant during interviews with children by saying that 
they needed help from “little detectives” to keep the teacher in jail.  Id. at 1380.  
Some children were even given mock police badges for cooperating.  Id.  The 
court concluded that “the interrogations that occurred in this case were improper 
and there is a substantial likelihood that the evidence derived from them is 
unreliable.”  Id. at 1384. 
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been declared incompetent to testify.  In Minnesota, a child is 
presumed competent to testify unless the judge concludes that “the 
child lacks the capacity to remember or to relate truthfully facts 
respecting which the child is examined.”164  Considering the district 
court’s finding that T.B. was incompetent to testify and the role of 
government officers in obtaining his statements,165 a jury should 
closely scrutinize T.B.’s testimony.  The majority, in allowing for the 
admission of T.B.’s untested hearsay statements, failed to even 
acknowledge the inherent unreliability associated with such 
statements166 or the corresponding risk that untrue statements will 
implicate an innocent defendant. 
2. Manipulation of Interviewing Conditions 
Bobadilla also established precedent that encourages 
government agents to manipulate their procedures to ensure 
statements taken during an interview are considered 
nontestimonial.  Child welfare agencies and law enforcement 
officials will likely define their investigative procedures to 
guarantee any statements made by children are considered 
nontestimonial.  The American Prosecutors Research Institute167 
recently noted, after discussing Bobadilla’s reliance on the 
nontestimonial purpose of the interview with T.B., that 
“[r]egardless of the forensic interviewing protocol utilized, forensic 
interviewing professionals should be cognizant of the Court’s 
language in holding that this interview was nontestimonial.”168  The 
American Prosecutors Research Institute’s statement demonstrates 
that public authorities may tailor their interviewing procedures 
toward so-called nontestimonial purposes, with police simply 
 
 164. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(m) (2004). 
 165. See supra notes 87–100 and accompanying text. 
 166. Several of T.B.’s responses during the interview with the child protection 
worker demonstrate the importance of scrutinizing a young child’s statements.  
T.B. initially indicated that his father was not present when Bobadilla committed 
the abusive act.  State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn. 2006).  Later in 
the interview, T.B. responded “yeah” when asked if his father witnessed the abuse.  
Id.  Although inconsistent responses of this nature do not indicate T.B.’s 
accusations are untrue, they do suggest that under certain circumstances, a child 
could provide erroneous information to investigators. 
 167. The American Prosecutors Research Institute filed an amicus curiae brief 
in favor of the State of Minnesota in Bobadilla.  709 N.W.2d at 245. 
 168. Allie Phillips, A Ray of Hope in the Wake of Crawford v. Washington: An 
Analysis of Bobadilla v. Minnesota (pt. 1), APRI UPDATE (Am. Prosecutors Res. 
Inst., Alexandria, Va.), Jan. 2006, at 1, 2. 
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observing and subtly recording statements for possible use at a later 
trial. 
A recent Minnesota County Attorney’s Association newsletter 
illustrates this outcome.169  Kandiyohi County Attorney Boyd 
Beccue, in discussing the implications of Bobadilla upon future 
prosecutions, wrote: 
Anyone advising social workers and law enforcement 
investigators must carefully review the decision and 
incorporate the court’s guidance, giving particular 
attention to the discussion of M.S. § 626.556. 
It is clear that not only should a police investigator never 
be present in the room where a child is being questioned, 
the assessment must be carefully designed to meet the 
purposes of M.S. § 626.556. . . . I am inclined to believe 
that it may even be wise to not have police officers nearby 
when the assessment is occurring.  It is better to insure 
that child protection workers are well trained and 
understand the impact of Bobadilla on their 
investigations.170 
Prosecutors are discussing ways in which government agencies 
should conduct sexual abuse interviews so that statements made by 
victims will be admissible at trial.171  The mere fact that such 
discussions are occurring indicates that a primary purpose of many 
child assessment interviews is to develop statements for use at a 
later trial.  Moreover, a prosecutor’s attempt to hide the purpose of 
an interview implicates Crawford’s concern about statements made 
with the “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production 
of testimony with an eye toward trial” which present a “unique 
potential for prosecutorial abuse.”172 
 
 169. Boyd Beccue, State v. Bobadilla: Comments from Kandiyohi County Attorney 
Boyd Beccue, THE MONTHLY BRIEF (Minn. County Att’y Ass’n, St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 
2006, at 3, 3. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Manipulation of interviewing procedures was a fairly predictable outcome 
of the majority opinion, although one must ask whether government 
manipulation is a predictable by-product of Crawford’s testimonial—
nontestimonial distinction.  Such a question, however, is beyond the scope of this 
case note. 
 172. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2003).  The prospect of 
prosecutorial abuses is particularly apparent in child sexual abuse cases.  District 
attorneys often tout successful child sexual abuse prosecutions as part of their 
political campaigns.  See, e.g., Peter T. Wendel, The Case Against Plea Bargaining 
Child Sexual Abuse Charges: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 64 MO. L. REV. 317, 339–40 
(1999) (describing how a district attorney used his prosecution of a “‘sicko’ who 
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The county attorney newsletter also indicates that a significant 
aspect of post-Bobadilla child sexual abuse investigations will be the 
intentional lack of law enforcement presence at interviews.173  
Effective criminal investigations usually involve investigators at least 
observing an interview with the victim.174  Thus, Bobadilla not only 
created a framework that encourages government agents to 
manipulate their interviewing procedures, it also established a 
constitutional standard that promotes ineffective investigative 
procedures.  Kandiyohi County Attorney Boyd Beccue 
acknowledged this point in his comments published in the 
Minnesota County Attorney newsletter, writing, “[Bobadilla] leads 
us to believe that the less law enforcement involvement with the 
assessment, the better.  While this places an extra burden on the 
child protection worker and may be unsatisfactory to police 
investigators, the direction our court has taken regarding what 
constitutes a ‘testimonial’ statement compels this course.”175 
3. An Alternative Approach 
Efforts to conceal the motivation underlying child interviews 
suggest that courts must carefully scrutinize the circumstances in 
which officials elicit information from children.  Prosecutors have 
expressed the need to conduct interviews in a way that creates the 
appearance of a nontestimonial purpose so that prosecutors can 
use the child’s statements in a testimonial manner.176  Child 
protection workers are essentially being asked to act as proxies for 
law enforcement to ensure a child’s statements are deemed 
nontestimonial.177  Courts consequently cannot view the mere 
 
sexually abuses children” as part of his reelection campaign). 
 173. Beccue, supra note 169, at 3. 
 174. JAMES W. OSTERBURG & RICHARD H. WARD, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION: A 
METHOD FOR RECONSTRUCTING THE PAST 18, 238 (1992). 
 175. Beccue, supra note 169, at 3. 
 176. Id.; Phillips, supra note 168, at 1–2. 
 177. Justice Page, in dissent, noted that the social worker who interviewed T.B. 
was partly acting as a surrogate for the police detective, and suggested that T.B.’s 
statements fit well within Crawford’s judgment that statements made in the course 
of a police interrogation were testimonial.  State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 
257–58 (Minn. 2006) (Page, J., dissenting).  Other jurisdictions have found 
statements to be testimonial because child protection workers acted as a proxy for 
law enforcement.  The Illinois Appellate Court held that statements made by a 
seven-year-old child to a child-protection worker were testimonial, noting that “if 
the State could simply use the surrogate testimony of social workers . . . then 
prosecutors would have less motivation” to prepare a child to testify in court.  In re 
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absence of law enforcement as objective evidence of an interview’s 
purpose. 
Instead, courts should consider whether investigators 
possessed sufficient facts to warrant the presence of law 
enforcement at an interview.  In other words, did officials have 
information, prior to the interview, to justify a criminal 
investigation?  If so, courts should infer the presence of a police 
detective at the interview.  Courts must recognize that the lack of 
law enforcement at an interview with a sexual abuse victim may 
demonstrate forethought on the part of officials to ensure 
prosecutors can use the interview against the defendant at trial.  
Even under Bobadilla’s narrow standard, statements taken by an 
interviewer with the intent to use them at a later trial are 
testimonial.178 
Vigorous scrutiny of the purpose behind child protection 
interviews will result in courts’ admitting fewer out-of-court 
statements made by young children.  It will not, however, 
completely foreclose the prosecution of child sexual abuse.  
Prosecutors can, for example, introduce nontestimonial statements 
made by children, which are no longer subject to any constitutional 
restrictions.179  Other potential evidence may also be available, such 
 
T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 802–03 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).  In State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 
(Or. 2004), a child-protection worker took over an interview after police were 
unable to establish dialogue with a three-year-old child.  Id. at 350.  The child 
protection worker and police detective were investigating the murder of the 
child’s two-year-old brother.  Id. at 349–50.  The child made statements to the 
child-protection worker implicating his mother’s boyfriend in the murder, but the 
child was later declared incompetent to testify.  Id. at 350.  The Supreme Court of 
Oregon held that the child’s statements were testimonial, saying the child 
protection worker was serving as a proxy for the police investigator.  Id. at 352. 
 178. See Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 253.  Davis v. Washington reaffirmed the need 
to objectively consider the questioner’s intent when weighing whether a statement 
is testimonial.  126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006). 
 179. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  Use of a child’s out-of-court 
statements at trial is still subject to hearsay restrictions.  Minnesota’s statutory 
hearsay exception permits prosecutors to introduce many nontestimonial 
statements made by young children relating to sexual abuse.  See supra notes 38–41 
and accompanying text.  Ironically, Minnesota’s tender-year exception still 
includes a provision requiring that the statement possess sufficient “indicia of 
reliability,” which essentially mirrors the previous Roberts standard.  See supra text 
accompanying note 40.  In light of precedent implying that nontestimonial 
statements are no longer subject to constitutional scrutiny, the legislature is free to 
remove the “indicia of reliability” requirement.  See Laird Kirkpatrick, Crawford: A 
Look Backward, A Look Forward, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2005, at 6, 9–10 (noting that a 
decision removing nontestimonial statements from Sixth Amendment scrutiny 
would permit legislatures to rewrite hearsay exceptions without concern for 
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as testimony from health-care workers relating to physical 
symptoms of abuse or incriminating statements made by the 
defendant.180 
Officials involved in prosecuting child sexual abuse must also 
seek to increase the likelihood that a child is able to testify.  
Research indicates that simple steps, such as giving children 
courtroom tours and ensuring a support person remains in the 
courtroom, are associated with reduced stress while testifying.181  
Allowing the child to testify on closed-circuit television also 
decreases anxiety by ensuring the child is not traumatized by 
encountering the defendant.182  For those children declared 
incompetent to testify, prosecutors must seek other means to prove 
sexual abuse.  Although this will interfere with the ability to 
prosecute some abusers, admitting a young child’s out-of-court 
testimonial statements not only degrades the Sixth Amendment,183 
but it also raises the prospect that juries will convict innocent 
defendants. 
Unfortunately, a decision barring prosecutors from using 
statements made by children during assessment interviews would 
result in some abusers not receiving justice.  Perhaps it was this 
underlying concern that prompted the court to hold that T.B.’s 
statements were nontestimonial.  As written, the majority’s 
 
constitutional constraints imposed by Roberts). 
 180. In Bobadilla, for example, the prosecution could introduce T.B.’s 
statements to his mother and the emergency room physician.  See Bobadilla, 709 
N.W.2d at 246.  The physician can also testify about the unusual redness on T.B.’s 
buttocks.  See id. 
 181. Gail S. Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses: A National Survey, 5 
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 255, 259 (1999).  Among the factors associated with 
increased stress on child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are multiple pre-court 
interviews, lengthy delays, testimony in the defendant’s presence, multiple 
testimonies, and lack of parental support.  Id. at 258. 
 182. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), holding that a child sexual 
abuse victim could testify via one-way closed circuit television without violating the 
Confrontation Clause.  The prosecution and defense counsel conducted the 
examination in a separate room while the defendant and jury watched from the 
courtroom.  Id. at 841.  The defendant remained in electronic communication 
with defense counsel throughout the examination.  Id. at 842.  Several post-
Crawford cases have upheld the constitutionality of closed-circuit television 
testimony.  See State v. Henriod, 131 P.3d 232, 237–38 (Utah 2006); State v. 
Blanchette, 134 P.3d 19, 29 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
 183. Justice Page, in dissent, acknowledged that the majority articulated the 
importance of protecting children, but recognized that, “[o]n the facts of this 
case, that important need conflicts with the Sixth Amendment, which, under our 
system of justice, must prevail.”  Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 261 (Page, J., dissenting). 
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mischaracterization of the relevant statutory scheme and 
misapplication of the factual circumstances surrounding the 
interview with T.B. are unpersuasive.  But considering the horrific 
nature of child sexual abuse, it is possible that many will find the 
majority’s opinion quite persuasive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States Constitution established a number of 
principles that are highly valued in our society.  Among those is the 
right of a criminal defendant to confront his or her accuser.184  
Bobadilla presented a situation in which the right of confrontation 
conflicted with society’s compelling interest in protecting children 
from unspeakable crimes.  When such conflicts arise, it is the courts 
that are to ensure constitutional principles prevail.185  But in 
Bobadilla, the Minnesota Supreme Court largely ignored the 
confrontation rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment, choosing 
instead to focus on the need to protect children from sexual abuse.  
In so doing, the court established precedent that jeopardizes the 
fairness of future sexual abuse prosecutions.  Indeed, after 
Bobadilla, many sexual abuse trials will present statements made by 
young children implicating defendants who will lack any genuine 
opportunity to test the reliability of such damning evidence. 
 
 
 184. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 185. Justice Marshall recognized the burden often associated with adhering to 
certain fundamental values, writing that “sometimes we must pay substantial social 
costs as a result of our commitment to the values we espouse.”  United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See also U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI; Marks, supra note 31, at 210 (noting that those accused of sexually 
abusing children “represent an insular minority whose rights must be protected 
against the majority”). 
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